After raising the question on the morality of launching an airstrike against the communists in Cuba, both EX-COMM and the JCS had instead decided on blockading Cuba and its surroundings as well as using a deadly airstrike on the ballistic missiles in San Cristobal. Through this tactic no Soviet ships could reach Cuba, and by attacking American military ships, they would have started the fight, and President Kennedy would have allowed the use of nuclear missiles against both Cuba and the Soviet Union. However, President Kennedy once again disagreed with using both a blockade and an airstrike, and in a article named “The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, 1962” by Professor Jerry Goldman of Northwestern University, President Kennedy specifically disagreed with the choices made by EX-COMM and the JCS because the “air strike would give the USSR ‘a clear line’ to take Berlin, and the United States would be recognized as “trigger-happy Americans” (“The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, 1962,” par. 13). Not only were the men of both EX-COMM and the JCS querulous with President Kennedy regarding his statements, but they were also shocked to find out that four more additional nuclear assembly sites had been found during U-2 flights. It appeared as if the nuclear arms race between the communists and Americans was heating up, and President Kennedy’s cabinet members now felt even more justified using airstrikes against Castro’s communist forces in Cuba.
Actual Blog Date: May 3, 2011
Historical Date: October 19, 1962